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“Truth, it has been said, is the first casualty of war.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
America’s Global War on Terror2 began as a direct response to the deadli-
est terrorist attack in modern history.3 On September 11, 2001, the Taliban-
backed terrorist group al-Qaeda coordinated four separate attacks on New York 
and Washington, D.C. that took the lives of nearly three thousand innocent 
people.4 With strong domestic and international support, America invaded Af-
ghanistan in October of 2001 with several focused objectives: overthrow the 
Taliban government, destroy al-Qaeda’s training camps, and capture or kill 
Osama bin Laden.5 Although U.S. military forces quickly overthrew the Tali-
ban government and destroyed al-Qaeda’s network within Afghanistan’s bor-
ders,6 America soon found itself being drawn into global conflict as its resilient 
and highly mobile enemy retreated across international borders to regroup and 
return as an insurgent force.7 The U.S. military campaign was not deterred. 
President Bush made America’s commitment clear, saying, “The message to 
every country is, there will be a campaign against terrorist activity, a worldwide 
campaign . . . Freedom-loving people understand that terrorism knows no bor-
ders, that terrorists will strike in order to bring fear . . . [a]nd we will not let 
them do that.”8 
The worldwide campaign against terrorism that President Bush promised in 
2001 quickly became a reality⎯one that continues to this day. Besides the war 
                                                        
2  See 32 C.F.R. § 578.32 (2007); Anup Shah, War on Terror, GLOBAL ISSUES (Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/245/war-on-terror. 
3  U.S. War in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-
war-afghanistan/p20018 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 11 1–
2, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10288.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). 
4  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 3; 9/11 by the Numbers, N.Y. MAG. Sept. 2014, 
http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm. 
5  Interview by Tavis Smiley with U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley (Sept. 2, 2011), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/tavissmiley/features/targeting-terrorists-counterterrorism-in-a-post-
911-world/destroying-al-qaeda-training-camps/. 
6  See Satinder Bindra, India Identifies Terrorist Training Camps, CNN (Sept. 19, 2001, 9:36 
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/19/inv.afghanistan.camp/; Da-
vid Rohde & C.J. Chivers, A Nation Challenged; Qaeda’s Grocery Lists and Manuals of 
Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/17/world/a-nation-
challenged-qaeda-s-grocery-lists-and-manuals-of-killing.html; DOD News Briefing, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF. (Oct. 23, 2001, 2:15 PM), http://webcache.googleusercon 
tent.com/search?q=cache:8uZXte0pPUoJ:www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx%3F
TranscriptID%3D2155+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (“I can tell you that we have struck 
all of the terrorist training camps that we are aware of. I can’t tell you that I know what a 
number is, and I think that you can appreciate that if al Qaeda has an ability to train, they 
will try to make or find a camp that they can use. There aren’t going to be any camps that 
we’re going to allow them to use, and when we find them, we’ll strike them.”). 
7  See U.S. War in Afghanistan, supra note 3. 
8  The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). 
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in Afghanistan⎯the longest war in U.S. history9⎯America is currently en-
gaged in armed conflicts10 in Pakistan,11 Yemen,12 and Uganda,13 and military 
interventions14 in Iraq,15 Syria,16 and against the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL).17 In addition, the U.S. has engaged in military actions18 in the 
Philippines,19 under Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines;20 Mali,21 
Chad,22 Mauritania,23 and Niger,24 under Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-
Sahara;25 Somalia,26 Kenya,27 Djibouti,28 Sudan,29 and Eritrea,30 under Com-
                                                        
9  Thomas Nagorski, Editor’s Notebook: Afghan War Now Country’s Longest, ABC NEWS 
(June 7, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/afghan-war-now-longest-war-us-history/st 
ory?id=10849303. 
10  See generally INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” 
DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 5 (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org 
/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (defining armed conflict as “armed 
force between two or more States”). 
11  Steve Coll, The Unblinking Stare, NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.newyork 
er.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare. 
12  Get the Data: Drone Wars, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.the 
bureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). 
13  Ken Opalo, The Consequences of the U.S. War on Terrorism in Africa, ALJAZEERA AM. 
(June 2, 2014, 12:45 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/6/africom-u-s-war-
onterrorisminafricaalshabaabbokoharam.html. 
14  See generally Military Intervention, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreediction 
ary.com/military+intervention (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (“The deliberate act of a nation or 
a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controver-
sy.”). 
15  Loveday Morris, The U.S. Military is Back Training Troops in Iraq, but It’s a Little Dif-
ferent This Time, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-us-
military-is-back-training-troops-in-iraq-but-its-a-little-different-this-
time/2015/01/08/11b9aa58-95f2-11e4-8385-866293322c2f_story.html. 
16  Craig Whitlock, U.S. Military Leaders: Strikes in Syria Are Just the Start of a Prolonged 
Campaign, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-attacks-
islamic-state-in-syria-with-five-middle-east-partners/2014/09/23/b78ad7e8-c8f2-4aa8-aaa7-
ec92572f6716_story.html. 
17  Mark Thompson, U.S. Military Plan for Looming ISIS Offensive Takes Shape, TIME (Feb. 
26, 2015), http://time.com/3722740/isis-islamic-state-military/. 
18  As used here, the phrase “military actions” encompasses a broad range of activities based 
on geographic location and other factors. It includes, but is not limited to, U.S. military base 
agreements, regional counter-terrorism support, air strikes, training, weapons supply, and aid 
and support projects. See infra, footnotes 19–47. 
19  Jim Gomez, Deadly Filipino Anti-Terror Raid Bittersweet for U.S., MIL. TIMES (Mar. 18, 
2015 9:23 AM), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/03/18/deadly-filipino-
anti-terror-raid-bittersweet-for-us-forces/24951213/. 
20  Joe Penney, The ‘War on Terror’ Rages in the Philippines, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 5, 2011, 
10:31 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2011/10/2011104145947651645. 
21  Maria Ryan, ‘War in Countries We are not at War With’: The ‘War on Terror’ on the Pe-
riphery from Bush to Obama, 48 INT’L POL. 364, 371 (2011). 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, supra note 12. 
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bined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa;31 Algeria,32 Morocco,33 Nigeria,34 
Senegal,35 and Tunisia,36 under the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative;37 
and Georgia,38 Azerbaijan,39 Kazakhstan,40 Uzbekistan,41 Tajikistan,42 Kyrgyz-
stan,43 Ethiopia,44 Burkina Faso,45 Kashmir,46 and Libya.47 Collectively, these 
thirty-two military actions comprise America’s Global War on Terror. 
Maintaining an open-ended global war is a monumental task. In an effort to 
keep up with its enemies, both old and new, the United States continually 
adapts its military forces around the world. One such adaptation has been the 
introduction and ever-increasing use of armed, remotely piloted aircraft, com-
monly referred to as “drones.”48 Drones are marketed to the public as the con-
summate wonder-weapon⎯one that prevents civilian casualties by striking en-
emies with “surgical precision.”49 The drone program is supplied with pilots 
from the United States Air Force (“USAF”),50 but it is administered under two 
                                                                                                                                 
27  Opalo, supra note 13. 
28  Ryan, supra note 21, at 371. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. at 372. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 371. 
38  Id. at 373. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Opalo, supra note 13. 
45  Id. 
46  Michael Smith, SAS Joins Kashmir Hunt for bin Laden, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 23, 2002, 12:01 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/1385795/SAS-joins-Kashmir-
hunt-for-bin-Laden.html. 
47  U.S. Military Airstrikes in Libya Likely Kill al-Qaida-Linked Militant, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(June 14, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.nola.com/military/index.ssf/2015/06/us_mili 
tary_airstrikes_in_liby.html. 
48  Warren Bass, How the U.S. Stumbled into the Drone Era, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2014, 
4:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-u-s-stumbled-into-the-drone-era-14062348 
12. 
49  John Brennen, White House Counterterrorism Adviser, Speech on Drone Ethics at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center (May 1, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/ 
01/151778804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics. 
50  Chris Woods, CIA’s Pakistan Drone Strikes Carried Out by Regular US Air Force Per-
sonnel, GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://www.theguardi 
an.com/world/2014/apr/14/cia-drones-pakistan-us-air-force-documentary; Home of the 
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distinct chains of command; the Department of Defense (“DOD”) directs op-
erations in the war zone of Afghanistan,51 and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(“CIA”) directs most, if not all, drone operations everywhere else.52 In a state of 
war, such as that in Afghanistan, the use of armed drones by the USAF repre-
sents little more than the technological advancement of modern warfare.53 But 
outside of war, targeted killing54 by the CIA’s drone program represents much 
more. The CIA’s program operates without transparency, eliminating any op-
portunity for public or judicial scrutiny of military actions carried out in the 
name of the United States and its citizens.55 The CIA does not disclose its crite-
ria for selecting targets, its procedures for protecting non-combatants, the effect 
of its operations on civilian populations, or the existence of authorization from 
the sovereign nations in which the CIA deploys armed drones.56 
Although the Director of the CIA, John Brennen, and the Obama Admin-
istration have assured the American public that the CIA’s drone operations are 
“surgically precise,”57 the claim does not stand up to scrutiny.58 Before it was 
                                                                                                                                 
Hunters, CREECH AIR FORCE BASE, http://www.creech.af.mil/units/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2015). 
51  Alice K. Ross, Erased US Data Shows 1 in 4 Missiles in Afghan Airstrikes Now Fired by 
Drone, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Mar. 12, 2013), 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/03/12/erased-us-data-shows-1-in-4-missiles-in-
afghan-airstrikes-now-fired-by-drone/; Micah Zenko, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to 
Pentagon, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 2013), http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-
cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434. 
52  See Greg Miller, CIA Remains Behind Most Drone Strikes, Despite Effort to Shift Cam-
paign to Defense, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.washington 
post.com/world/national-security/cia-remains-behind-most-drone-strikes-despite-effort-to-
shift-campaign-to-defense/2013/11/25/c0c07a86-5386-11e3-a7f0-b790929232e1_story.html; 
Zenko, supra note 51.  
53  Christopher Drew, Drones Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business/17uav.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
54  Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
[T]argeted killings are premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of 
peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody. 
“Targeted killing” is not a term distinctly defined under international law, but gained 
currency in 2000 after Israel made public a policy of targeting alleged terrorists in the 
Palestinian territories. The particular act of lethal force, usually undertaken by a na-
tion’s intelligence or armed services, can vary widely—from cruise missiles to drone 
strikes to special operations raids. The primary focus of U.S. targeted killings, par-
ticularly through drone strikes, has been on the al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership net-
works in Afghanistan and the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. However, U.S. opera-
tions have expanded in recent years to include countries such as Somalia and Yemen. 
Id. 
55  Miller, supra note 52; Zenko, supra note 51. 
56  Miller, supra note 52; Zenko, supra note 51. 
57   Coll, supra note 11; see also Ken Dilanian, U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy to Rely on 
Surgical Strikes, Unmanned Drones, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2011), http://articles.lati 
mes.com/2011/jun/29/news/la-pn-al-qaeda-strategy-20110629; Devin Dwyer, Obama: Nobel 
Peace Prize Winner Becomes Drone Warrior-in-Chief, ABC NEWS (May 29, 2012), 
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usurped for the public relations campaign, the term “surgical precision” was not 
used to define covert actions that resulted in double-digit civilian casualties.59 
Before the CIA’s drone program, it would not have been understood to describe 
erroneous strikes on civilian grandmothers,60 children,61 and innocent Ameri-
cans.62 Nor would it have been used to describe strikes on a Yemeni wedding 
party that left fourteen civilians dead.63 The term would not have been used to 
describe the killing of twenty-six of the thirty-two people gathered to resolve a 
mining dispute in Pakistan,64 or to describe the sixty-nine school children who 
were killed when a drone strike destroyed their school so that the CIA could 
eliminate the school’s headmaster, a known militant.65 Unfortunately, in the 
course of America’s Global War on Terror, the term “surgically precise” has 
been redefined to mean all of these things. 
Alarmed by reports of civilian casualties and targeted killings that mirror 
extrajudicial assassinations, concerned citizens and organizations have attempt-
ed to utilize the Freedom of Information Act to obtain records outlining the le-
gal justification for the CIA’s use of armed drones in non-war zones.66 Con-
gress passed the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA” or “Act”) in 1966 in an 
effort to increase the transparency of federal government agencies.67 The legis-
lature structured FOIA to allow access “to official information long shielded 
unnecessarily from public view and . . . to create a judicially enforceable public 
                                                                                                                                 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Blotter/obama-drone-warrior-chief/story?id=16451227; 
Conor Friedersdorf, Calling U.S. Drone Strikes ‘Surgical’ Is Orwellian Propaganda, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/calling-us-
drone-strikes-surgical-is-orwellian-propaganda/262920/. 
58  See Coll, supra note 11. See also Dilanian, supra note 57; Dwyer, supra note 57; Frie-
dersdorf, supra note 57. 
59  Friedersdorf, supra note 57. 
60  Karen McVeigh, Drone Strikes: Tears in Congress as Pakistani Family Tells of Mother’s 
Death, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/wo 
rld/2013/oct/29/pakistan-family-drone-victim-testimony-congress. 
61  Chris Woods, The Day 69 Children Died, EXPRESS TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2011), 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/229844/the-day-69-children-died/. 
62  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chair-
man, Comm. on the Judiciary (May 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/slideshow/AG-letter-
5-22-13.pdf. 
63  Hakim Almasmari, Yemen Says U.S. Drone Struck a Wedding Convoy, Killing 14, CNN 
(Dec. 13, 2013, 6:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/meast/yemen-u-s-drone-
wedding/. 
64  Salman Masood & Pir Zubair Shah, C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html. 
65  Woods, supra note 61. 
66  See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014), sup-
plemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014); Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 898 F. Supp. 2d 233 
(D.D. Cir. 2012); First Amendment Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 12-1013 CW, 2014 
WL 1411333, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014), vacated, No. C 12-1013 CW, 2014 WL 
7148340 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2014). 
67  Nat’l Sec. Counselors, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 252. 
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right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands.”68 
Recognizing the inherent difficulties in administering such a progressive piece 
of legislation, Congress carefully designed FOIA to strike a workable balance 
between broad provisions favoring public disclosure and specific exemptions 
protecting certain legitimate government interests.69  
Courts must make determinations of fact and law when adjudicating claims 
arising under FOIA. Since FOIA’s enactment, courts have developed several 
methods for efficiently dealing with the large number of cases resulting from 
the government’s refusal to disclose documents requested under the Act. Courts 
use two judicial constructs, the Vaughn index70 and the Glomar response,71 in 
reviewing withheld documents, which allows them to quickly and correctly de-
termine whether the claimed exemptions fit within the scope of the Act. The 
courts have been effectively utilizing the Vaughn index and the Glomar re-
sponse since the 1970s72 to ensure that Congress’s vision of an informed citi-
zenry does not go beyond the scope of the exemptions provided by FOIA.  
Although the courts had successfully and correctly applied FOIA law for 
decades, the CIA created and began using the no number, no list response in 
2004. Unlike the Vaughn index and the Glomar response, which help the with-
holding agency attempt to justify its exemptions to the reviewing court, the no 
number, no list response is a simple assertion that documents responsive to a 
FOIA request are exempt from disclosure.73 Since at least 2012, the CIA has 
responded to FOIA requests regarding drone attacks with the no number, no list 
response, allowing it to evade valid judicial proceedings, and ultimately, to op-
erate outside the scope of the law.74  
In light of the CIA’s numerous erroneous drone strikes and legally suspect 
practices, this note argues that it is critical that the judicial branch apply FOIA 
law as Congress intended, thereby eliminating the CIA’s ability to continue its 
use of the no number, no list response. This note proceeds in four parts. Part I 
provides a brief overview of the Freedom of Information Act and its exemp-
tions, and describes the structure of the Vaughn index and the Glomar response. 
                                                        
68  John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989). 
69  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 27 (1966); see also E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973), 
superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), as recognized in CIA v Sims, 471 U.S. 159 
(1985). 
70  See generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
71  See generally Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bassiouni v. CIA, No. 02 
C 4049, 2004 WL 1125919, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004). 
72  See generally Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1009; Bassiouni, 2004 WL 1125919 at *7. 
73  N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2014); see ACLU v. 
CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (giving a brief timeline of previous no number, no list 
cases); see also First Amendment Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 12-1013 CW, 2014 
WL 1411333, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014). 
74  New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014); See N.Y. Times Co., 752 F.3d at 
126. 
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Part II outlines the CIA’s creation of the no number, no list response, and de-
scribes how it initially passed judicial scrutiny. Part III demonstrates how the 
no number, no list response destroys the balance between the protections af-
forded by FOIA’s exemptions and the public’s “right to know.”75 Finally, Part 
IV suggests eliminating the no number, no list response, and outlines the long-
standing FOIA law that should operate in its place.  
I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: ITS PURPOSE AND EXEMPTIONS 
Enacted by Congress on July 4, 1966, and taking effect one year later,76 the 
Freedom of Information Act allows and encourages public access to federal 
government records with the express purpose of lifting “the veil of administra-
tive secrecy” and exposing government actions to public scrutiny.77 Under 
FOIA, “any person”78 has a legally enforceable right to obtain records from any 
of the fifteen departments or seventy-three agencies of the executive branch of 
the federal government, which expressly includes the CIA, unless such records 
fall within one of nine exemptions provided for in FOIA’s statutory language.79  
The Freedom of Information Act provides that “[an] agency, upon any re-
quest for records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in 
accordance with published rules . . . shall make the records promptly available 
to any person.”80 The text outlines the procedures for properly requesting agen-
cy records.81 Under FOIA, “records” is broadly defined to include papers, let-
ters, reports, video footage, pictures, audio recordings, and any other documen-
tary information in the possession or control of a government agency.82 FOIA 
requires that upon receipt of a records request, the agency grant or deny the re-
quest within twenty working days.83 If a record cannot be released, the with-
holding agency is required to assert one or more of FOIA’s nine statutory ex-
emptions in its denial.84 The requestor may appeal the withholding agency’s 
denial and, if necessary, may challenge it in court.85  
                                                        
75  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 154 (1989). 
76  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT (2013). 
77  Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). 
78  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). Under FOIA, “all United States citi-
zens, as well as foreign nationals, are entitled to invoke the provisions of FOIA. Further-
more, requests for records, documents, and information may be made in the name of a corpo-
ration, partnership, and/or other entity. In other words, under FOIA, a request for federal 
government records can be made by anyone, anywhere, and for any reason.” Elizabeth 
O’Connor Tomlinson, Litigation Under Freedom of Information Act, 110 AM. JUR. TRIALS 
367, § 5 (Aug. 2015). 
79  What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2015). 
80  5 U.S.C. § 552. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. at (a)(3)(B). 
83  Id. at (a)(6)(A)(i). 
84  Id. at (b)(1)–(9). 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are— 
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A cause of action arises under FOIA when a government agency “(1) im-
properly (2) with[holds] (3) agency records.”86 “The agency asserting the ex-
emption bears the burden of proof, and all doubts regarding the applicability of 
the exemption must be resolved in favor of disclosure.”87 An agency may meet 
its burden by providing affidavits that describe “the documents and the justifi-
cations for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the 
information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption[s], and [that 
it is] not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence 
of agency bad faith.”88 “[C]onclusory affidavits that merely recite statutory 
                                                                                                                                 
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret 
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursu-
ant to such Executive order;  
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;  
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), if that 
statute—  
(A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no dis-
cretion on the issue; or  
(ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld; and  
(B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to 
this paragraph.  
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged 
or confidential;  
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to 
a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;  
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clear-
ly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;  
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to 
interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an 
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential 
source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which 
furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information com-
piled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an 
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by 
a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement inves-
tigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or 
(F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;  
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf 
of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institu-
tions; or  
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. 
85  Introduction to FOIA, FOIADVOCATES, http://www.foiadvocates.com/intro.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 8, 2015). 
86  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989). 
87  Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing A. Michael’s Piano, 
Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
88  Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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standards, or are overly vague or sweeping will not . . . carry the government’s 
burden . . . .”89  
After hearing many cases involving the government’s refusal to disclose 
properly requested records, the courts created the Vaughn index and the 
Glomar response to aid in the proper and efficient handling of FOIA litiga-
tion.90 The circumstances under which one or the other is triggered differ 
slightly, but the goal of each is the same: to prescribe the manner in which a 
withholding agency must attempt to prove to the reviewing court that it proper-
ly denied a request under FOIA.  
A. Vaughn Index 
To allow for the quick and effective examination of an agency’s withheld 
records, the withholding agency provides the reviewing court with a Vaughn 
index. A Vaughn index “(1) describes the justifications for non-disclosure with 
reasonably specific detail; (2) demonstrates that the information withheld logi-
cally falls within the claimed exemptions; and (3) shows that the justifications 
are not controverted by evidence in the record or by evidence of bad faith on 
the part of the agency.”91  
The index is the result of Vaughn v. Rosen, a 1973 case that addressed 
challenges faced by the public when seeking information under FOIA, and the 
difficult task shouldered by the courts in this unique area of law.92 At issue was 
a FOIA request that had been directed to the Civil Service Commission, which 
sought disclosure of certain reports from the Bureau of Personnel Manage-
ment.93 The Director of the Civil Service Commission refused to release docu-
ments responsive to the request, asserting that the information was not subject 
to disclosure under FOIA exemptions (b)(2), (b)(5), and (b)(6).94 Upon the 
agency’s refusal, the requestor, Robert Vaughn,95 filed an action in U.S. Dis-
trict Court seeking an injunctive order to compel the disclosure of the withheld 
information.96 The Civil Service Commission responded with a motion to dis-
miss, supported only by a conclusory affidavit asserting that the Director of the 
Commission held the opinion that the material was not subject to disclosure 
under FOIA.97 Based solely on the opinion of the withholding agency’s direc-
                                                        
89  Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
90  See generally Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
91  Bassiouni v. CIA, No. 02 C 4049, 2004 WL 1125919, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004) (cit-
ing Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
92  See generally Vaughn, 484 F.2d 820. 
93  Id. at 822. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. at 820. 
96  Id. at 823. 
97  Id. 
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tor, the district court granted the agency’s motion to dismiss.98 Vaughn ap-
pealed.99  
The Vaughn court began its discussion by outlining the then existing pro-
cedures government agencies used when asserting exemptions under FOIA.100 
Although the Act was less than a decade old, the court found numerous exam-
ples where government agencies had provided conclusory affidavits declaring 
that the factual nature of information requested under FOIA would not be dis-
closed pursuant to one of the various FOIA exemptions.101 Despite Congress’s 
statutory mandate requiring the withholding agency prove the applicability of a 
claimed exemption, the Vaughn court found that trial courts typically accepted 
such affidavits due to the overwhelming volume of documents in question, of-
ten numbering in the hundreds or even thousands of pages.102 Even where a tri-
al court did examine the withheld documents, the in camera (private) review 
was necessarily conducted without the presence of the adverse party, heavily 
undermining the adversarial nature of the U.S. legal system.103 The court found 
that: 
existing customary procedures foster inefficiency and create a situation in which 
the Government need only carry its burden of proof against a party that is effec-
tively helpless and a court system that is never designed to act in an adversary 
capacity. It is vital that some process be formulated that will (1) assure that a 
party’s right to information is not submerged beneath governmental obfuscation 
and mischaracterization, and (2) permit the court system effectively and effi-
ciently to evaluate the factual nature of disputed information.104 
The Vaughn court formulated a three-step procedure for testing claimed 
exemptions.105 First, in accordance with the provisions of FOIA, courts require 
government agencies to provide relatively detailed justifications, proving the 
appropriate exemptions for each withheld document.106 Second, agencies are 
required to specify, separate, and index material, allowing the reviewing court 
to quickly examine documents and compare them with claimed exemptions.107 
Third, withholding agencies are required to justify exemptions, providing a ba-
sis for the adverse party to challenge the denial.108 The procedure, which came 
to be known as the Vaughn index, satisfied the court’s goals.109 More im-
portantly, it provided other courts with a tool to effectively handle FOIA litiga-
                                                        
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
100  See id. at 824. 
101  See id. at 825. 
102  Id. 
103  See id. 
104  Id. at 826. 
105  Id. at 826–28. 
106  Id. at 826. 
107  Id. at 827. 
108  Id. at 828. 
109  Id. 
16 NEV. L.J. 345, MEISSNER - FINAL.DOCX 1/26/16  1:18 PM 
356 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:345  
tion going forward, enabling them to balance public interests against the inter-
ests of the government.110  
While the purpose of the Vaughn index remains unchanged, more than for-
ty years of litigation has fine-tuned its application to meet the myriad needs 
arising under FOIA litigation. Where highly sensitive materials are involved, a 
Vaughn index may consist of a “particularly persuasive affidavit”111 together 
with brief descriptions of the withheld information. Alternatively, the agency 
may request in camera review.112 Typically, however, “the index is public and 
relatively specific in describing the kinds of documents the agency is withhold-
ing.”113 District courts have considerable discretion to determine what consti-
tutes “reasonably specific detail”114 on a case-by-case basis. This allows the re-
viewing court to ensure the agency meets its burden of proof under FOIA, 
while protecting the information it hopes to withhold.115 Ultimately, a Vaughn 
index must provide the reviewing court with a “reasonable basis” for evaluating 
the agency’s asserted exemptions.116  
B. Glomar Response 
Several years after the creation of the Vaughn index, unusual circumstanc-
es related to national security led to the creation of the Glomar response.117 The 
Glomar response allows an agency to “refuse to confirm or deny the existence 
of records,”118 but only when the knowledge of existence vel non (or nonexist-
ence) of responsive records would itself cause harm.119 
The Glomar response originated in Phillippi v. CIA during the height of the 
Cold War.120 In 1968, a Soviet Golf-Class submarine, the K-129,121 sank 750 
miles northwest of Hawaii, still laden with nuclear weapons.122 Shortly after the 
sinking, business magnate Howard Hughes purportedly began construction on 
                                                        
110  See id. at 823. 
111  N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 122 (2d Cir. 2014), opinion 
amended on denial of reh’g, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014), supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d 
Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), citing with approval, ACLU v. CIA, 
710 F.3d 422, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
112  ACLU, 710 F.3d at 433. 
113  Id. at 432. 
114  Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
115  ACLU, 710 F.3d at 432. 
116  Delaney, Migdail & Young v. IRS, 826 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
117  See generally Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
118  ACLU, 710 F.3d at 426 (citing Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
119  Id. 
120  See Trent Schindler, Raising Sunken Ships, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/saf/1305/fea 
tures/ship.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2015). 
121  Matthew Aid et al., Project Azorian: The CIA’s Declassified History of the Glomar Ex-
plorer, THE NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Feb. 22, 2010), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nuke 
vault/ebb305/. 
122  Schindler, supra note 120. 
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the Hughes Glomar Explorer, an enormous barge allegedly meant for mining 
manganese nodules from the ocean floor.123 In fact, Howard Hughes and his 
manganese nodule mining project were part of an elaborate cover story; the 
Hughes Glomar Explorer had actually been commissioned by the CIA as part 
of an ambitious and covert plan to raise the Soviet submarine.124 
Several news organizations published rumors regarding the true purpose of 
the Hughes Glomar Explorer, and in 1975, journalist Harriet Phillippi125 sub-
mitted a FOIA request to the CIA, seeking any documents that it possessed re-
garding the vessel.126 The CIA denied the request, claiming that “any records 
that might exist which reveal any CIA connection with or interest in the activi-
ties of the Glomar Explorer; and, indeed, any data that might reveal the exist-
ence of any such records” were exempt under FOIA, and therefore, not subject 
to disclosure.127 After Phillippi’s appeal to the agency failed, she filed for in-
junctive relief in U.S. District Court, seeking justification for each document on 
which the CIA had asserted an exemption.128 In response, the CIA submitted an 
affidavit to the court in camera, signed by Brent Scowcroft, then Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs.129 The affidavit asserted that 
“[o]fficial acknowledgement of the involvement of specific United States Gov-
ernment agencies would disclose the nature and purpose of the Program and 
could . . . severely damage the foreign relations and the national defense of the 
United States.”130 After reviewing Scowcroft’s affidavit, the district court 
found that the withheld material was properly exempt from disclosure under 
FOIA.131 The court granted summary judgment for the CIA, and Phillippi ap-
pealed.132 
The issue decided by the Phillippi court was not whether the documents 
must be disclosed; rather, it decided whether “the Agency should have been re-
quired to support its position on the basis of the public record.”133 The court de-
termined that in the limited circumstances where an agency “can neither con-
firm nor deny the existence of the requested records, there are no relevant 
documents for the court to examine other than the affidavits which explain the 
Agency’s refusal.”134 The Phillippi court found that the public record consisted 
entirely of rumors published in newspapers, not disclosures by the agency it-
                                                        
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Aid, supra note 121. 
126  Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 1012. 
129  Id. at 1013. 
130  Id. at 1013–14. 
131  Id. at 1012. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. (emphasis added). 
134  Id. at 1013. 
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self.135 The court held that this alone did not waive the agency’s right to assert 
what is now referred to as a Glomar response.136 
A Glomar response is an “exception to the general rule that agencies must 
acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a FOIA request and 
provide specific, non-conclusory justifications for withholding that information 
. . . .”137 A Glomar response is therefore permitted only when confirming or 
denying the existence of records would itself “cause harm cognizable under [a] 
FOIA exemption.”138 Accordingly, to determine whether the existence vel non 
of agency records fits an exemption under FOIA, courts apply the review 
standards established in non-Glomar cases.139 Because a Glomar response is 
properly invoked only when the disclosure of the existence or nonexistence of 
agency records is itself exempt under FOIA, requestors may overcome this re-
sponse by showing that the agency has already disclosed the existence vel non 
of responsive records.140 Still, a failed Glomar response does not necessarily 
mean that a government agency will be compelled to disclose information oth-
erwise protected under FOIA’s exemptions.141 However, once information on 
the existence vel non has been disclosed, the agency must provide the review-
ing court with a Vaughn index to allow it to “determine whether the contents—
as distinguished from the existence—of the officially acknowledged records 
may be protected from disclosure . . . .”142 
II. AN EXTRAJUDICIAL SOLUTION TO A NON-PROBLEM: THE CIA’S “NO 
NUMBER, NO LIST” RESPONSE 
The no number, no list response was first considered by a court in Bassio-
uni v. CIA,143 nearly three decades after the Vaughn index and the Glomar re-
sponse were established. The “no number, no list response acknowledges the 
existence of documents responsive to [a FOIA] request, but neither numbers 
nor identifies them by title or description.”144 The response originated as a sim-
ple legal misunderstanding, asserted by the Information Review Officer for the 
Directorate of Operations of the CIA,145 but began to take on a sense of quasi-
                                                        
135  Id. at 1017. 
136  Id. 
137  Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
138  Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
139  Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
140  ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
141  Id. at 432. 
142  Wolf, 473 F.3d at 380. 
143  Bassiouni v. CIA, No. 02 C 4049, 2004 WL 1125919, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004) 
aff’d, 392 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 2004). 
144  N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g grant-
ed, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). 
145  See Bassiouni, 2004 WL 1125919, at *4–5. 
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legitimacy as it passed through courts for more than a decade before being de-
tected.  
A. Bassiouni v. CIA—District Court 
In 1983, Mahmoud Bassiouni wrote to the CIA seeking all material it pos-
sessed regarding himself, pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974.146 The CIA re-
sponded that it had material responsive to his request, but that it was classified 
and could not be released.147 Sixteen years later, in 1999, Bassiouni wrote to 
the CIA seeking the same records, this time utilizing the rights afforded to him 
under FOIA.148 When the CIA again refused to disclose all relevant responsive 
records, Bassiouni filed suit in U.S. District Court to compel the CIA to pro-
duce a Vaughn index to justify its claimed exemptions under FOIA.149 The CIA 
moved for summary judgment and submitted a detailed affidavit (hereinafter 
“McNair Declaration”) signed by William McNair, then Information Review 
Officer for the Directorate of Operations of the CIA.150 The McNair Declara-
tion asserted McNair’s authority, pursuant to Executive Order 12,958, to con-
duct classification reviews and make classification decisions.151 The McNair 
Declaration states, in part: 
This case is one in which the CIA would normally use a Glomar response—
neither confirming nor denying it holds documents on plaintiff. However, since 
the CIA personnel handling plaintiff’s 1983 Privacy Act request acknowledged 
the Agency held material on plaintiff at that time, CIA cannot use the Glomar 
response in 2003. The only practical alternative at this point, to protect classified 
and otherwise exempt information, is to use the ‘no number, no list’ response 
. . . .152 
The McNair Declaration went on: 
Assuming CIA still holds responsive documents, providing a portion of the 
withheld responsive documents, or even a list or number of such responsive 
documents, would expose sensitive and classified methods and would reveal the 
extent of the U.S. collection efforts, analysis and reporting directed at particular 
targets. It could further reveal the relative priority that the CIA attached to a par-
ticular intelligence subject and indicate where the Agency had allocated its lim-
ited resources. This could reveal U.S. policy interests and expose strengths and 
gaps in the Agency’s intelligence gathering ability. It would reveal information 
that could damage U.S. foreign relations.153 
                                                        
146  Id. at *1. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at *1, *4. 
151  Id. at *4. 
152  Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
153  Id. at *7. 
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Bassiouni argued that there were two critical problems with the McNair 
Declaration. First, McNair cited his authority pursuant to Executive Order 
12,958, which states that a federal agency may “refuse to confirm or deny the 
existence or nonexistence of requested information whenever the fact of its ex-
istence or nonexistence is itself classified . . . .”154 In other words, Executive 
Order 12,958 authorizes a Glomar response.155 After McNair admitted that the 
CIA could no longer give a Glomar response, he cited his authority by an Ex-
ecutive Order authorizing one.156 The second, and more important point Bas-
siouni argued, was that the CIA’s use of a no number, no list response was not 
supported by any legal authority, either in the text of FOIA or in any case 
law.157 The court summarily rejected both arguments, claiming that it would 
not “become fixated with labels or parse semanties [sic].”158  
Although the Bassiouni court was not fixated with labels or on parsing se-
mantics, it was intensely focused on meeting the provisions of a FOIA-
compliant affidavit, as prescribed in Hunt v. CIA.159 According to Hunt, which 
the Bassiouni court cited, an agency’s affidavit meets FOIA’s requirements for 
exemption if it: “(1) describes the justifications for non-disclosure with reason-
ably specific detail; (2) demonstrates that the information withheld logically 
falls within the claimed exemptions; and (3) shows that the justifications are 
not controverted by evidence in the record or by evidence of bad faith on the 
part of the agency.”160 To support the CIA’s position, McNair provided to the 
court, in camera, “reasonably specific detail [demonstrating] that the infor-
mation withheld logically falls within [FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)].”161 
The court found that the justifications were “a well-reasoned, specific and plau-
sible basis for concluding that [exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)] preclude further 
identification of records responsive to Bassiouni’s request due to the detri-
mental effects of disclosure on intelligence methods, interests, sources and ca-
pabilities, as well as detrimental effects on United States foreign relations.”162 
In short, although McNair mistakenly labeled the affidavit a “no number, no 
list” response, he had in fact provided the court with nothing less than an in 
camera Vaughn index, in full compliance with the requirements of FOIA—the 
distinction was lost on the court.163 
Despite decades of case law, and even the court’s own direct quote and 
comparison to Hunt, which outlines the form of a FOIA-compliant Vaughn in-
                                                        
154  Exec. Order No. 12958, 32 C.F.R. 701.23 § 3.7(a) (1995). 
155  See ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
156  See Bassiouni, 2004 WL 1125919, at *4. 
157  Id. at *5. 
158  Id. at *6. 
159  Id. at *3. 
160  Id. (citing Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
161  Id. at *7. 
162  Id. 
163  See id. at *6. 
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dex, it held that “the CIA [did] not [waive] the right to assert a ‘no number, no 
list’ response to Bassiouni’s FOIA . . . request, and that such a response was 
appropriate.”164 Bassiouni appealed.165 
B. Bassiouni v. CIA—Court of Appeals 
 While the district court determined that the differences between a Glomar 
and a no number, no list response could be chalked up to semantics,166 the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals took the fundamental misunderstanding a step 
further.167 The court considered whether “it would be best to jettison the dis-
tinction between” the twenty-nine-year-old judicially created Glomar response, 
along with the protections it afforded, together with the nine-month-old CIA-
created no number, no list response, in favor of a new reply that “could cover 
both situations”—the “Bassiouni Response.”168 Importantly, as of January 7, 
2016, no other court has mentioned the “Bassiouni Response.” Instead, based 
on the “legally identical” assertion made by the court (discussed infra), other 
courts still accept the CIA’s use of the no number, no list response.  
The Seventh Circuit went on to state that neither the Glomar response, 
which “[refuses] to acknowledge whether the CIA has even one responsive 
document,” nor the no number, no list response, which “[acknowledges] that 
the CIA has at least one responsive document but [refuses] to elaborate,” held 
any “magic” significance.169 The court held that leaving the Glomar response 
and the no number, no list response intact would confuse judges into thinking 
“that something depends on the turn of a phrase.”170 It declared the two re-
sponses “legally identical”171 and affirmed the district court’s decision.172 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE NO NUMBER, NO LIST RESPONSE 
 The Seventh Circuit’s “legally identical” assertion in Bassiouni rubber-
stamped the CIA’s ability to deny FOIA requests at will. Prior to the creation of 
the no number, no list response, the CIA denied requests—like all other federal 
government agencies subject to FOIA—by providing a list of withheld docu-
ments, along with the exemptions it was claiming on each. In special circum-
stances, when the CIA had not disclosed the existence vel non of records re-
sponsive to a request, it issued a Glomar response.173 The requestor could then 
                                                        
164  Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 
165  See generally Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 2004). 
166  Bassiouni, 2004 WL 1125919, at *6. 
167  See Bassiouni, 392 F.3d at 247. 
168  Id.  
169  See Bassiouni, 392 F.3d at 247. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. at 248. 
173  See, e.g., ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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challenge the Vaughn index or the Glomar response in court, where the agency 
would attempt to prove that its withheld records were properly exempt under 
FOIA.174 If the reviewing court found that the agency’s records were in fact ex-
empt, it would uphold the denial and no information would be disclosed.175 But 
critically, where the agency’s records did not fit under at least one of FOIA’s 
exemptions, the court compelled disclosure in accordance with the Act.176 The 
Vaughn index and the Glomar response complemented each other and pre-
served the public’s “right to know,”177 while ensuring that the exemptions pro-
vided for under FOIA were upheld. After Bassiouni, everything changed. 
The holding in Bassiouni was disappointing for two reasons. First, despite 
decades of FOIA case law that had developed procedures and safeguards to ad-
dress circumstances exactly like those presented in Bassiouni, the court “jetti-
son[ed]” the Glomar response to allow for the amorphous no number, no list 
response.178 Second, and more importantly, by allowing a government agency 
to assert a no number, no list response, the distinction between a Vaughn index 
and a Glomar response was effectively destroyed.179 Simply stated, the Seventh 
Circuit’s “legally identical” assertion gutted the mechanisms that had allowed 
FOIA to operate as Congress had intended.  
A. Jarvik v. CIA 
Emboldened by its success in the Seventh Circuit, the CIA continued its 
use of the no number, no list response in Jarvik v. CIA, where the court took the 
misunderstanding further still.180 The Jarvik court gave the no number, no list 
response a legal test and what appeared to be an increasingly legitimate purpose 
within FOIA’s statutory scheme.181 
At issue was a FOIA request, submitted by Laurence Jarvik in 2006, that 
sought all records possessed by the CIA “relating to the violence of May 2005 
and its aftermath [in Andijan, Uzbekistan], as well as subsequent trials and 
evaluation of refugees.”182 The CIA responded to the request, stating that it had 
“located [records] which [it] had determined [to be] currently and properly 
classified and [therefore, the FOIA request] must be denied in its entirety on the 
basis of . . . exemptions (b)(1) & (b)(3).”183 Despite acknowledging that it held 
records responsive to the request, the CIA continued by claiming, “the only re-
sponse [that it] can provide on the public record in this case is the general ‘no 
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number, no list’ declaration,” because any other response “could reasonably be 
expected to cause serious damage to the national security.”184  
In the “Factual & Procedural Background” section of its opinion, the Jarvik 
Court notes that CIA had “located [records]”185 responsive to the plaintiff’s re-
quest. In order to test this assertion, the court looked to Phillippi v. CIA,186 the 
Hughes Glomar Explorer case that led to the Glomar response.187 Quoting Phil-
lippi, the court held that where the CIA “can neither confirm nor deny the ex-
istence of the requested records, there are no relevant documents for the court 
to examine other than the affidavits which explain the [a]gency’s refusal.”188 
Despite facts that directly contradicted the legal test being employed, the Jarvik 
court held that the Glomar test applied to the CIA’s assertion of a no number, 
no list response, and the court thus denied the plaintiff’s request for discov-
ery.189  
B. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Courts Begin to Challenge the No 
Number, No List Response 
More than a decade after its dubious creation, seven courts had heard cases 
involving the CIA’s use of the no number, no list response: six of the courts 
appeared to accept the Seventh Circuit’s “legally identical” assertion and ruled 
accordingly.190 Only the D.C. Circuit noted a “material difference” between a 
Glomar and a no number, no list response in ACLU v. CIA:191  
A Glomar response requires the agency to argue, and the court to accept, that the 
very fact of the existence or nonexistence of responsive records is protected 
from disclosure. That is conceptually different from conceding (or being com-
pelled by the court to concede) that the agency has some documents, but none-
theless arguing that any description of those documents would effectively dis-
close validly exempt information. There may be cases where the agency cannot 
plausibly make the former (Glomar) argument with a straight face, but where it 
can legitimately make the latter.192 
In dicta, the court found that a no number, no list response might be viewed as 
a minimalist form of a Vaughn index, applicable only in very unusual circum-
                                                        
184  Id. at 123 (emphasis added). 
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stances, and justified only by a “particularly persuasive affidavit.”193 Although 
the court did not reference Bassiouni, this is precisely what the McNair Decla-
ration had provided—a “particularly persuasive affidavit” and an in camera 
Vaughn index.194 Unfortunately, the ACLU court’s analysis necessarily ended 
with the issues being litigated, and it left no clear direction for other courts to 
follow going forward.195  
C. N.Y. Times v. U.S. Department of Justice—District Court 
The facts in N.Y. Times v. U.S. Department of Justice pushed Bassiouni’s 
“legally identical” assertion beyond any form of reason. The FOIA requests at 
issue focused primarily on CIA drone strikes that killed three United States cit-
izens in 2011—suspected terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, his son Abdulrahman al-
Awlaki, and Samir Khan.196 New York Times reporters Scott Shane and Char-
lie Savage (collectively “N.Y. Times”) and the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (collectively “ACLU”) 
each submitted separate, but similar, requests for information concerning the 
attacks.197 They specifically requested any documents prepared by the Office of 
Legal Counsel (“OLC”) of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) regarding the 
CIA’s legal justification for targeted killing generally, as well as the extrajudi-
cial execution of United States citizens abroad.198 
1. N.Y. Times and ACLU FOIA Requests 
 Shane’s request to the OLC sought “[A]ll Office of Legal Counsel opinions 
or memoranda since 2001 that address the legal status of targeted killings, as-
sassination, or killing of people suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist 
groups by employees or contractors of the United States government.”199 Sav-
age’s request, also submitted to the OLC, sought “[A] copy of all Office of Le-
gal Counsel memorandums analyzing the circumstances under which it would 
be lawful for United States armed forces or intelligence community assets to 
target for killing a United States citizen who is deemed to be a terrorist.”200 
The ACLU submitted identical, but separate, requests201 to (1) the DOJ 
(including two of the DOJ’s component agencies—the Office of Information 
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194  See Bassiouni v. CIA, No. 02 C 4049, 2004 WL 1125919, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004) 
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1. All records created after September 11, 2001, pertaining to the legal basis in do-
mestic, foreign, and international law upon which U.S. citizens can be subjected to 
targeted killings, whether using unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs” or “drones”) or 
by other means. 
2. All records created after September 11, 2001, pertaining to the process by which 
U.S. citizens can be designated for targeted killings, including who is authorized to 
make such determinations and what evidence is needed to support them. 
3. All memoranda, opinions, drafts, correspondence, and other records produced by 
the OLC after September 11, 2001, pertaining to the legal basis in domestic, foreign, 
and international law upon which the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki was au-
thorized and upon which he was killed, including discussions of: 
A. The reasons why domestic-law prohibitions on murder, assassination, and exces-
sive use of force did not preclude the targeted killing of al-Awlaki; 
B. The protection and requirements imposed by the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause; 
C. The reasons why International-law prohibitions on extrajudicial killing did not pre-
clude the targeted killing of al-Awlaki; 
D. The applicability (or non-applicability) of the Treason Clause to the decision 
whether to target al-Awlaki; 
E. The legal basis authorizing the CIA, JSOC, or other U.S. Government entities to 
carry out the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki; 
F. Any requirement for proving that al-Awlaki posed an imminent risk of harm to 
others, including an explanation of how to define imminence in this context; and 
G. Any requirement that the U.S. Government first attempt to capture Al-Awlaki be-
fore killing him. 
4. All documents and records pertaining to the factual basis for the targeted killing of 
Al-Awlaki, including: 
A. Facts supporting a belief that al-Awlaki posed an imminent threat to the United 
States or United States interests; 
B. Facts supporting a belief that al-Awlaki could not be captured or brought to justice 
using nonlethal means; 
C. Facts indicating that there was a legal justification for killings persons other than 
al-Awlaki, including other U.S. citizens, while attempting to kill al-Awlaki himself; 
D. Facts supporting the assertion that al-Awlaki was operationally involved in al 
Qaeda, rather than being involved merely in propaganda activities; and 
E. Any other facts relevant to the decision to authorize and execute the targeted kill-
ings of al-Awlaki. 
5. All documents and records pertaining to the factual basis for the killing of Samir 
Khan, including whether he was intentionally targeted, whether U.S. Government 
personnel were aware of his proximity to al-Awlaki at the time the missiles were 
launched at al-Awlaki’s vehicle, whether the United States took measures to avoid 
Khan’s death, and any other facts relevant to the decision to kill Khan or the failure to 
avoid causing his death. 
6. All documents and records pertaining to the factual basis for the killing of Ab-
dulrahman al-Awlaki, including whether he was intentionally targeted, whether U.S. 
Government personnel were aware of his presence when they launched a missile or 
missiles at his location, whether he was targeted on the basis of his kinship with 
Anwar al-Awlaki, whether the United States took measures to avoid his death, and 
any other factors relevant to the decision to kill him or the failure to avoid causing his 
death. 
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Policy (“OIP”) and the OLC); (2) the DOD; (3) and the CIA (collectively 
“Government”).202 The ACLU’s requests sought any documents concerning the 
targeted killings of United States citizens generally, as well as any documents 
specifically related to al-Awlaki, his son, and Khan.203  
2. Government Responses 
The OLC bifurcated Shane’s FOIA request, and denied both parts.204 First, 
the OLC acknowledged involvement with the DOD, but submitted a no num-
ber, no list response pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5).205 
Second, the OLC submitted a “Glomar response” regarding documents pertain-
ing to agencies other than the DOD.206 
The OLC also denied Savage’s request, and submitted a Glomar response 
asserting exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5).207 Unlike its response to Shane, 
the OLC’s initial response to Savage “did not identify responsive documents 
relating to the DOD.”208 During litigation, the OLC modified its response to 
both reporters to acknowledge the existence of one document, referred to as the 
“OLC–DOD Memorandum,” but claimed that it was exempt from disclosure 
under exemption (b)(5).209 After acknowledging the existence of an OLC-DOD 
relationship, the OLC did not make clear whether it was continuing to assert a 
no number, no list response, as it had made to Shane, or a Glomar response, as 
it had made to Savage.210  
The OLC provided the ACLU with a Vaughn index that listed sixty unclas-
sified email chains, each reflecting “internal deliberations”211 regarding extra-
judicial lethal force against United States citizens.212 The OLC withheld the 
emails pursuant to exemption (b)(5).213 It also submitted a no number, no list 
response, stating that the remaining records were protected from disclosure by 
exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).214 The DOD provided the ACLU with a speech 
given at Yale Law School in 2012 by then DOD General Counsel Jeh Johnson, 
and a Vaughn index that listed ten unclassified records, withheld pursuant to 
exemption (b)(5).215 The DOD also acknowledged that it possessed the OLC–
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DOD Memorandum, but withheld it under exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(5).216 The 
DOD submitted a no number, no list response for all other responsive rec-
ords.217 
3. The Court’s Holding 
Dissatisfied with the Government’s sweeping and unsubstantiated respons-
es, the N.Y. Times and the ACLU filed a consolidated action in U.S. District 
Court, seeking an injunctive order to compel the disclosure of the OLC-DOD 
Memorandum, as well as Vaughn indices for all withheld documents, rather 
than the no number, no list and Glomar responses they had received.218  
The district court acknowledged that “[t]he FOIA requests [at] issue impli-
cate serious issues about the limits on the power of the Executive Branch under 
the Constitution and laws of the United States.”219 The court continued “[t]he 
Administration has engaged in public discussion of the legality of targeted kill-
ing, even of [United States] citizens, but in cryptic and imprecise ways, gener-
ally without citing to any statute or court decision that justifies its conclu-
sions.”220 But the court, finding itself “constrained by law,”221 could “only 
conclude that the Government has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over 
the documents sought in the FOIA requests, and so cannot be compelled . . . to 
explain . . . why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the Unit-
ed States.”222 The court declared that 
The Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but af-
ter careful and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situ-
ation in which I cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and 
rules—a veritable Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and 
precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to 
proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible 
with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a 
secret.223  
After claiming it was bound by precedent, the court considered the plain-
tiffs’ arguments regarding the Glomar and no number, no list responses.224 It 
began by finding that, contrary to the holding in Bassiouni, a Glomar and a no 
number, no list response are in fact separate and distinct concepts, and that their 
structures are not “legally identical.”225 But the court’s analysis of the issue 
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ended there.226 After finding that the core holding in Bassiouni was incorrect, 
the court looked to the same body of erroneous case law—Bassiouni and Jar-
vik—to determine that “Glomar law should be used to evaluate the propriety of 
a No Number, No List response.”227 Accordingly, the court applied the Glomar 
test to all the Government’s responses and found the plaintiffs’ objections to 
the Glomar and no number, no list responses to be “without merit.”228 It grant-
ed summary judgment in favor of the Government.229  
D. N.Y. Times v. U.S. Department of Justice—Court of Appeals 
On appeal, N.Y. Times and the ACLU pressed for the disclosure of the 
OLC-DOD Memorandum and Vaughn indices for all withheld documents.230 In 
its discussion, the N.Y. Times court of appeals focused on the Government’s as-
sertion that disclosure of the legal analysis in the OLC-DOD Memorandum 
would jeopardize national security by revealing “military plans, intelligence ac-
tivities, sources and methods . . . .”231 It also focused on the Government’s as-
sertion that even if the legal analysis could be disclosed, it would still pose a 
threat to national security because it would identify the agency or agencies 
“that had an operational role in the drone strike that killed al-Awlaki.”232  
In its evaluation of the Government’s claims, the N.Y. Times court of ap-
peals referenced several public pronouncements made by government officials 
that concerned the legal analysis of targeted killings, and the CIA’s direct in-
volvement in the program.233 Speaking at Northwestern University in 2012, At-
torney General Holder stated:  
[I]t is entirely lawful—under both United States law and applicable law of war 
principles—to target specific senior operational leaders of al Qaeda and associ-
ated forces . . . [if] [f]irst, the U.S. government has determined, after a thorough 
and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation 
would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war princi-
ples.234 
The Attorney General emphasized the last point by saying that the “use of le-
thal force by the United States will comply with the four fundamental law of 
war principles governing the use of force . . . necessity[,] . . . distinction[,] . . . 
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proportionality[,] . . . [and] humanity.”235 In March 2010, then CIA Director 
Leon Panetta said: 
Anytime we get a high value target that is in the top leadership of al Qaeda, it 
seriously disrupts their operations . . . . It [sends] two important signals . . . . No. 
1 that we are not going to hesitate to go after them wherever they try to hide, and 
No. 2 that we are continuing to target their leadership.236 
The court noted that “the reference to ‘we’ [did] not unequivocally [implicate 
the] CIA, and might arguably be taken as a reference to the Government gener-
ally,”237 but found this doubt was eliminated by a statement Panetta made three 
months later:238 
 [We] are engaged in the most aggressive operations in the history of the CIA in 
that part of the world, and the result is that we are disrupting their leadership. 
We’ve taken down more than half of their Taliban leadership, of their Al Qaida 
leadership. We just took down number three in their leadership a few weeks 
ago.239  
Panetta also stated: 
[Al-]Awlaki is a terrorist and yes, he’s a United States citizen, but he is first and 
foremost a terrorist and we’re going to treat him like a terrorist. We don’t have 
an assassination list, but I can tell you this. We have a terrorist list and he’s on 
it.240  
Furthermore, in October 2011, Panetta, then acting as Secretary of Defense, 
said “[h]aving moved from the CIA to the Pentagon, obviously I have a hell of 
a lot more weapons available to me in this job than I had at the CIA, although 
the Predators aren’t bad.”241 Then, in 2012, Scott Pelley of the television pro-
gram “60 Minutes” asked Panetta, “ ‘You killed al-Awlaki?’ Panetta ‘nodded 
affirmatively.’ ”242 Next, Panetta was asked about targeting a person who has 
been identified as an enemy combatant. Panetta said, “It’s a recommendation 
we make, it’s a recommendation the CIA director makes in my prior role 
. . . .”243 Finally, the current Director of the CIA, John Brennen, testified in 
front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2013, saying, 
“[t]he Office of Legal Counsel advice establishes the legal boundaries within 
which [the CIA] can operate.”244 
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 After reviewing the statements made by Attorney General Holder, current 
Director of the CIA John Brennan, and Leon Panetta in his roles as both Direc-
tor of the CIA and as the Secretary of Defense, the court determined:  
After senior Government officials have assured the public that targeted killings 
are “lawful” and that OLC advice “establishes the legal boundaries within which 
[the CIA] can operate,” and the Government makes public a detailed analysis of 
nearly all the legal reasoning contained in the OLC-DOD Memorandum, waiver 
of secrecy and privilege as to the legal analysis in the Memorandum has oc-
curred.245 
The court was careful to clarify that the waiver of protection regarding the legal 
analysis in the OLC-DOD Memorandum did not mean that the entire document 
would need to be disclosed.246 It cited FOIA, stating “[a]ny reasonably segre-
gable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record 
after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.”247 The 
court found that only parts II-VI of the OLC-DOD Memorandum had been of-
ficially acknowledged, and ordered only those parts disclosed.248  
The court also addressed the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the validity of 
no number, no list and Glomar responses.249 After quoting then CIA Director 
Panetta’s direct acknowledgement of the CIA’s use of armed drones, the court 
held that “the [Government’s] main argument for the use of Glomar and no 
number, no list responses evaporates.”250 In accordance with its holding, the 
court ordered the DOD and CIA to submit classified Vaughn indices for in 
camera inspection and disclosure on remand to the district court.251 Finally, a 
court demanded that the CIA substantiate its exemptions in accordance with the 
provisions of FOIA.  
IV. THE BEST WAY FORWARD 
The “Alice-in-Wonderland”252 analogy made by the district court in N.Y. 
Times v. CIA signals a fundamental breakdown in the judicial application of the 
Act. Congress did not enact FOIA to “allow the Executive Branch of our Gov-
ernment to proclaim . . . actions that seem . . . incompatible with our Constitu-
tion [to be perfectly lawful], while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a se-
cret.”253 Congress enacted FOIA “to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the 
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to 
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hold the governors accountable to the governed.”254 That is why clear, consist-
ently enforced procedures regarding the Vaughn index and the Glomar re-
sponse are absolutely critical to the ongoing viability of FOIA. 
The opinion written by the court of appeals in N.Y. Times was spot-on, but 
its rationale was virtually eclipsed by the messy intersection of the Glomar, 
Vaughn, and no number, no list responses. Although the court deftly cut 
through the myriad FOIA requests originating from three different sources, as 
well as the varying replies from the OLC, DOD, and the CIA, it did not directly 
address the no number, no list response, nor provide a clear framework for oth-
er courts going forward. Perhaps the court did not find it necessary; after all, 
the Vaughn index has been a judicial construct of FOIA exemptions since 
1973,255 and the Glomar response has been used since 1976.256 Nevertheless, 
the fact remains that without supplying the court with a “particularly persuasive 
affidavit”257 justifying the reasons for its withholding, the CIA is operating out-
side of the law when submitting a no number, no list response.258  
Although a no number, no list response may technically comply with FOIA 
when it takes the form of an in camera Vaughn index, the CIA’s abuse of the 
response has left little, if anything, worth salvaging. A better standard would be 
to eliminate the no number, no list response altogether, and return to the clearly 
defined legal framework provided for by the Vaughn index and the Glomar re-
sponse.  
Enforcing FOIA does not require any judicial or extrajudicial imagination. 
To return to FOIA-compliant law, reviewing courts should begin by examining 
the withholding agency’s Vaughn index. If a publicly disclosed, detailed 
Vaughn index would legitimately compromise government interests in national 
security, the agency may request in camera inspection.259 At that point, the 
court will ensure that legitimate issues of national security are not disclosed. In 
the most extreme situations, where an agency has not officially disclosed the 
existence vel non of records relating to the request, and the very existence of 
the information is protected under one or more of FOIA’s exemptions, a 
Glomar response may be properly invoked.260 Where an agency may properly 
invoke a Glomar response, it must supply the court with an in camera affidavit 
“giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall 
within an exemption,”261 allowing the court to ensure that the public’s “right to 
information is not submerged beneath governmental obfuscation and mischar-
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acterization . . . .”262 If a court follows this structure, and therefore the law, the 
no number, no list response will be unnecessary even in the most sensitive of 
cases. 
CONCLUSION 
For years, the CIA has been evading valid judicial proceedings by using 
unsubstantiated no number, no list responses. Between the incorrect “legally 
identical”263 assertion made by the Seventh Circuit in 2004, and the Vaughn in-
dex, which legitimately offers the court broad discretion in determining the 
requisite level of detail on a case-by-case basis, the true purpose behind FOIA’s 
exemptions has been all but lost.  
Today, amidst America’s ongoing Global War on Terror, an ever-
increasing number of erroneous CIA drone strikes264 coupled with targeted kill-
ings that mirror extrajudicial assassinations265 make it more important than ever 
to uphold the purpose behind the Act. By eliminating the no number, no list re-
sponse and applying the actual, long-standing FOIA rules across the board, the 
judiciary will not only ensure that legitimate matters of national security remain 
confidential, it will also ensure that the CIA does not operate above the law. 
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